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Abstract
A new conceptual key generation scheme is presented by using intrinsic quantum correlations of
single photons between Alice and Bob. The intrinsic bi-partite correlation functions allow key bit to
be generated through high level communication language i.e. a key bit is directly encoded to shared
correlation functions not to the state and detection of a photon at Bob does not mean key bit.
These make the scheme robust against intercept-resend attack because Alice and Bob can always
check the errors in their measurements and reveal the presence of Eve in their channel without
leaking any key bit information. The scheme is strictly relied on the perfect beam splitter and
mean photon number less than 1, where more than one photon in a coherent pulse will introduce
more errors in Bob even without the presence of Eve. From the percentage of errors in Bob,
we can estimate the amount of information will be leaked to Eve in the photon-number splitting
attack. This scheme can preserve the randomness of phase-randomized light source for doubling
the communication distance as in original Ekert’s protocol and providing the raw key generation
rate a factor of 2 higher than weak coherent light protocols.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The quantum mechanics without probability amplitude was proposed [1], leading to the
possibility of quantum information processing more directly in terms of probability i.e dis-
crete Wigner function [2]. In the same vein, it is exciting to explore quantum key genera-
tion [3, 4] with polarization correlation function or expectation value of two observers. In
general, two observers A and B will have eigenvalues ±1 corresponding to photon detection
at the transmitted or reflected port of their analyzers. The correlation function shared by
them is C(θa, θb) =
∑
±1(AB)P(θa, θb), where P(θa, θb) is the joint probability of detecting
a photon in observer A and B with their analyzers at θa and θb, respectively. The max-
imum/minimum values of C(θa, θb) = ±1 are corresponding to correlated/anti-correlated
outcomes of A and B such that the C = +1(A = +1,B = +1;A = −1,B = −1) and the
C = −1(A = +1,B = −1;A = −1,B = +1). There are totally four correlation functions
Cn = ±Cos2(θa ± θb), where n = 1, 2, 3, 4, available from intrinsic polarization correlation
of weak coherent states [5], coherent light mixed with random noise field [6] and coherent
light fields [7, 8]. These four correlation functions have been demonstrated and used to
perform bits correlations between two parties over a distance of 10 km, through a trans-
mission fiber by using weak coherent states in Ref.5. One can predict the outcome of the
other by guessing the Cn through their projection angles and photon detection. The secure
key bits between two observers A and B are then generated through sharing four bi-partite
correlation functions and photon counting.
The essence of the paper is to propose a new scheme for key generation based on single
photons bi-partite correlation functions. The proposed experiment setting is similar to
simplified EPR protocol (BBM92) [9], where the EPR pairs are replaced with two weak
coherent states prepared from a light source in the middle of Alice and Bob. The light source
is two modes (x, y) weak coherent states combined through a beam splitter producing two
spatially separated quantum channels. We have the product states at the input of the
beam splitter such that |α〉x(±i|β〉y) = e−nx2 e−
ny
2
∑∞
n=0
∑∞
m=0
nnx√
n!
nmy√
m!
|n,m〉 ∝ |0〉x|0〉y ±
i
√
nx|1〉x|0〉y ± i√ny|0〉x|1〉y + .., where ±i is provided by random phase modulator ±pi2
along the y-direction and nx, ny ≤ 1. The density matrix of the output state from the beam
splitter is dependant on the integration over the phase space of P representation for the
input product state. Since the |α〉x and |β〉y are intrinsically correlated from the same laser,
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the integration over the phase spaces of |α〉x and |β〉y can produce the output state that is
intrinsically entangled [10]. One can see that, the beam splitter transforms the input state
|α〉x(±i|β〉y) into inseparable output state ( |α〉x+ie
±iφm |β〉y√
2
)2(
i|α〉x+e±iφm |β〉y√
2
)1, where φm =
±90◦ is random modulated phase. The inseparable output state can provide four types of
bi-partite correlation functions (C1,2,3,4) by manipulating the linear phase shifters in Box 1 of
Alice. The security of this scheme is guaranteed by the fact that the nonorthogonality of the
product coherent states, which cannot be identified by a single measurement. The protocol
is strictly depended on equal mean photon number in the mode (x, y) i.e. nx = ny = nc < 1.
We will discuss how this condition can restrict more than one photon in a coherent pulse in
this protocol and hence to prevent the photon-number splitting attack. The single photons
sent to Alice and Bob are called ancilla photon and signal photon, respectively. The scheme
requires coincidence detection of ancilla photon at Alice and signal photon at Bob. The
ancilla photon passes through/reflects from an analyzer at Alice is registered as bit ’1’/’0’.
The signal photon passes through/reflects from an analyzer at Bob is denoted as ’yes’/’no’
of his guess on Alice’s key bit. ’Yes’ did not mean that Bob will have bit ’1’. It can be bit
’0’. Alice and Bob generate key bits through secure communication in the sense that the bit
information is encoded on the {Cn} not the state. We will discuss how the protocol is robust
against intercept-resend attack. The security analysis of this scheme may well be different
from current weak light protocols [11–16].
In this paper, we first outline the sequence of steps for implementing key generation
between Alice and Bob. Then, we discuss the physics and experimental detail of each step.
Finally, we briefly discuss how the protocol can prevent the photon-number splitting and
intercept-resend attacks.
II. THE IC-QKD PROTOCOL
The proposed experiment setup is shown in Fig.1. The setting is similar to the BBM92
protocol, where the EPR pairs are replaced with two mode and phase-modulated weak
coherent states, which are intrinsic-correlated from a laser source in the middle of Alice and
Bob. The two weak coherent states are distributed through two pulses within a bit period,
which is phase modulated in an asymmetric Mach-Zehnder interferometer (MZI).
Four bi-partite correlation functions (Cn, n = 1, 2, 3, 4) are assigned into two groups
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FIG. 1. The proposed experiment setup for implementing key generation using a signal photon at
Bob and an ancilla photon at Alice. The laser source is located in the middle of Alice and Bob, and
secured by a trusted third party. The two weak coherent states are distributed through two pulses
within a bit period. The dotted boxes (Box 1 and Box 2) are the wave plates used for preparing
bi-partite correlation between Alice and Bob. HWP: Half-Wave Plate, QWP: Quarter-Wave Plate,
SPD: Single Photon Detector, PBS: Polarization Beam Splitter, BS: Beam Splitter.
(Ψ,Φ), where C1,2 → Ψ and C3,4 → Φ. Alice will have the key bit ’0’ and ’1’ for the
correlation functions C1,3 and C2,4, respectively. Alice can randomly choose the correlation
function {Cn} and then her key bits. Bob guesses the correlation function based on his
polarization angle of his analyzer and records the outcome of his measurement i.e. ’yes’
or ’no’ of his guess. After the signal transmission, Alice then tells Bob through classical
channel about the sequence of groups {Ψ,Φ} that she has randomly chosen. Bob can then
know Alice’s key bit by the outcome of his measurement regardless he made a right or wrong
guess, so doubling the raw key generation rate.
To illustrate the scheme more systematically, we will discuss an example of the key
generation as shown in Fig.2.
Step− 1: Alice randomly chooses the Ψ{C1, C2} or Φ{C3, C4} by choosing the waveplates
combination in Box 1 as shown in Fig.1. (Alice randomly chooses the Cn is analog to choosing
a random basis in BB84.)
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FIG. 2. The scheme for key generation between Alice and Bob.
Step− 2: Alice fixes her polarizer at angle θ1 = +45◦ and records the valid detections of
the ancilla photon in ’+’ SPD3 and ’-’ SPD4 as bit ’1’ or ’0’.
Step− 3: Bob guesses on the Cn by projecting his polarizer at angles θ2 = ±45◦. The
θ2 = +45
◦ means Bob’s guess on {C1, C4}. The θ2 = −45◦ means Bob’s guess on {C2, C3}.
(Alice only chooses one polarization angle θ1 = +45
◦ and Bob chooses two polarization
angles θ2 = ±45◦ because of the shared Cn. We do not need to perform the violation of Bell
inequality in Ekert’s protocol. And also, not like BBM92, Alice and Bob do not need to
measure the basis (0◦, 90◦) of the incoming photon.)
Step− 4: The outcomes of Bob’s guess through the valid detections of signal photon.
’Yes’ means that the’+’ SPD1 ’click’ or his guess is right. ’No’ means that the ’-’ SPD2
’click’ or his guess is wrong. However, Bob did not know the Alice’s key bit yet.
(Alternative: Alice and Bob can detect the presence of Eve by broadcasting part of the
results obtained by Bob in step 3 and 4. They did not leak any bit information to Eve
because Alice will not announces the group information in step 5 for the exposed data. Note
that in BB84, Alice and Bob announce their choice of bases, and Bob never broadcast his
result which is the key bit.)
Step− 5: After the signal transmission, Alice announces to Bob through classical channel
about the group of her choice (Φ,Ψ), not revealing her choice of correlation function.
Step− 6: Bob knows Alice’s key bit after he received the group information and verified
with the record of his valid detection. To illustrate this, let’s say for the first column,
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Alice announces to Bob that the group is Φ. Bob’s guess on the group Φ is C4, which
is corresponding to bit ’1’. However, he knows that the guess is wrong through his valid
detection in step 4. From here, he knows Alice’s key bit is bit ’0’.
(The random choices of Cn in Alice and projection angle θ2 = ±45◦ in Bob did not need
to discard half of the raw keys compared to BB84 where Alice and Bob have the wrong
bases.)
We believe that this scheme can provide the raw key generation rate a factor of 2 higher
than the BB84 [17] and B92 [18], and double the communication distance as in the simpli-
fied EPR (BBM92) [9] and the original Ekert’s protocol [19]. We would outline the detail
explanation of each step.
A. Step 1, 2: Prepare and Measure
The light source is located in the middle of Alice and Bob. A pulsed, 45◦-polarized laser
light with a polarizing beam splitter (PBS) is used to provide a weak coherent state |α〉x
with horizontal polarization and another weak coherent state |β〉y with vertical polarization
in an asymmetric Mach-Zehnder interferometer (MZI). These coherent states are located at
two time slots and combined through a perfect 50/50 beam splitter (BS1), producing two
spatially separated beams, i.e., beam 1 and beam 2. The input state of the beam splitter is
a product state of two mode weak coherent states |α〉x|β〉y, which is the prepared state for
this protocol. The annihilation operators aˆ and bˆ are the input field operators for the beam
splitter (BS1) and for the coherent states |α〉x and |β〉y. The operator bˆ is phase-modulated
with the phase ±φa as bˆe±iφa , where φa = φm+φA, and φm = ±90◦ is randomly chosen. The
φa is produced by a phase modulator at the short arm of the MZI. The annihilation operators
cˆ = 1√
2
(aˆxˆ+ ibˆyˆ) and dˆ = 1√
2
(iaˆxˆ+ bˆyˆ) are the output field operators for the BS1, which are
sent through beam 2 to Bob and beam 1 to Alice, respectively. To distribute the operators
dˆ and cˆ to Alice and Bob, we first place a polarizer at 45◦ at each output of the BS1 so
that two pulses are co-polarized within a bit period. The reason is two orthogonal polarized
pulses may be vulnerable to Eve attacks. To create single photon quantum channel between
the source and Bob, the beam 2 is attenuated to single photon level with the mean photon
number per pulse (nx, ny) ≤ 1. Similarly, the beam 1 is further attenuated to single photon
level with mean photon number per pulse (nx, ny) ≤ 1. The co-polarized two pulses are sent
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through transmission fibers to Alice’s and Bob’s MZI, where the phase demodulators at the
short arms induced a phase of θB. Four pulses ( 2 in the x-mode and 2 in the y-mode) are
created within one bit period. The x-y mode (ei(±90
◦+φA), eiφB) in the middle time slot are
used for key generation. The phase (φA − φB = 0) can be accomplished by making use of
the phase coding αη system[20–23], which is proven to be more efficient secure encryption
system over long distances. Note that we apply phase coding αη system on a single photon
level instead of mesoscopic coherent state.
The random phase φm = ±90◦ is unknown to Bob and Alice. With the assumption
of low mean photon numbers for nx and ny, the two weak coherent states can be treated
as |α˜〉x|β˜〉y = e 12 (nx+ny [|0〉x|0〉y + √nx|1〉x|0〉y + √ny|0〉x|1〉y....], where we have considered
the vacuum and one photon number state in mode x or y. The phase φm = ±90◦ is not
included here because we have treated the φm in the annihilation operator bˆe
i(±φm+φA). Four
types of intrinsic bi-partite correlation functions C1,2 = {−cos2(θ1 − θ2),+cos2(θ1 + θ2)}
and C3,4 = {−cos2(θ1 + θ2),+cos2(θ1 − θ2)} can be established through the combination
of wave plates as shown in the dotted boxes (Box 1 and Box 2) in Fig.1. The half-wave
plates (HWP3 and HWP5) before the polarizing beam splitters (PBS1 and PBS2) at Bob
and Alice are used for projecting polarization angles θ1 and θ2, respectively, so that the
maximum correlation C1,2,3,4 = ±1 is obtained.
The annihilation operator dˆ at beam 1 is transformed through the combination of wave-
plates in Box 1 and a polarization analyzer consists of a half waveplate (HWP5) and a
polarizing beam splitter (PBS2). Alice can randomly choose the Cn, n=1,2,3,4 through the
settings of QWP2 and HWP1 as shown in the Box 1. For the correlation functions C1,2,3,4,
the photon number operator dˆ′
†
dˆ′ at Alice is given by,
dˆ′
†
dˆ′ =
1
2
[aˆ†aˆ+ bˆ†bˆ± aˆ†bˆe±i2θ1+iφm + c.c]. (1)
The expectation values for the correlation {C1,2} are given by,
C1 → 〈α˜β|dˆ′†dˆ′|α˜β〉 ∝ [nx + ny − 2√nxnycos(2θ1 + φm)]
C2 → 〈α˜β|dˆ′†dˆ′|α˜β〉 ∝ [nx + ny + 2√nxnycos(2θ1 − φm)], (2)
respectively. While the expectation values for the correlation {C3,4} are given by,
C3 → 〈α˜β|dˆ′†dˆ′|α˜β〉 ∝ [nx + ny − 2√nxnycos(2θ1 − φm)]
C4 → 〈α˜β|dˆ′†dˆ′|α˜β〉 ∝ [nx + ny + 2√nxnycos(2θ1 + φm)], (3)
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respectively. We have neglected the 1
2
e−(nx+ny) and higher photon number states for the
simplicity of the following discussions. Note that the condition nx = ny (perfect beam
splitter) has made the higher photon number states having the same form of interference
terms. Alice will observe the interference term of −Cos(2θ1+φm) for the C1, +Cos(2θ1−φm)
for the C2, −Cos(2θ1−φm) for the C3, and +Cos(2θ1 +φm) for the C4. For example, if Alice
chooses C1, she has the interference term of −Cos(2θ1 + φm). For the mean photon number
per pulse nx = ny = nc ≤ 1.0. The expectation value 〈dˆ′†dˆ′〉 will have the maximum value
of 2nce
−2nc and minimum value of 0. The maximum value of 〈dˆ′†dˆ′〉 is corresponding to the
interference term with value +1 and the minimum value (0) of 〈dˆ′†dˆ′〉 is corresponding to
the interference term with value -1. In other words, the interference term with value +1
indicates that the ancilla photon passed through a PBS2. While the interference term with
value -1 indicates that the ancilla photon reflected from a PBS2. The interference term with
the value +1 (-1) is corresponding to the detection of the ancilla photon at Alice’s detector
’+’SPD3 (’-’SPD4) or bit ’1’ (bit ’0’). Note that we are not going to multiply Alice’s and
Bob’s interference term and measure the mean value of the multiplied interference intensity
as previously demonstrated in ref [5], i.e., C1,2,3,4 = ±Cos2(θ1 ± θ2) , where the phase term
φm is varied from 0
◦ → 2pi.
B. Step 3, 4: Guess and Verify
The annihilation operator cˆ at beam 2 is transformed through a quarter waveplate
(QWP4) at 45◦ and a polarization analyzer (HWP3 and PBS1). The photon number oper-
ator at Bob is given by,
cˆ′
†
cˆ′ =
1
2
[aˆ†aˆ+ bˆ†bˆ+ aˆ†bˆei2θ2+iφm + bˆ†aˆe−i2θ2−iφm ], (4)
and then the expectation value is given by
〈α˜β˜|cˆ′†cˆ′|α˜β˜〉 ∝ [nx + ny + 2√nxnycos(2θ2 + φm)]. (5)
Bob has the same interference term cos(2θ2 + φm) for all the Cn because the QWP4 is
projected at the fixed angle +45◦ in Box 2. At Bob, if the single photon detector (SPD)
at ’+’ or ’-’ port detects the signal photon, he then assigned the valid detection as ’Yes’ or
’No’ for his guesses on Cn, n = 1, 2, 3, 4.
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In this scheme, the θ1 = +45
◦ at Alice is fixed. Let’s discuss the ideal situation where
Alice chooses the {Cn} with the right φm = ±90◦ and Bob guesses the right {Cn} with his
projection angle θ2. For example, if Alice chooses {C1; θ1 = +45◦} with the φm = −90◦, the
interference term in Alice has the value -1 indicating her ’-’ SPD4 will click. She records
the detection as bit ’0’. While interference term in Bob with his projection angle θ2 = +45
◦
has the value +1 indicating his ’+’ SPD1 will ’click’(’yes’). This means that his guess on
C1 is right. If Alice chooses {C2, θ1 = +45◦} with the φm = +90◦, her interference term
indicates that her ’+’ SPD3 will ’click’ or bit ’1’ is registered. The interference term in Bob
with the θ2 = −45◦ has the value +1 or his ’+’ SPD1 will ’click’(’yes’). This means that his
guess on C2 is right. Similarly, if Alice chooses {C3, θ1 = +45◦} with the φm = +90◦ and
{C4, θ1 = +45◦} with the φm = −90◦, she will register bit ’0’ and ’1’, respectively. Bob will
have the right guess on C3,4 with his projection angles θ2 = +45◦,−45◦, respectively.
We formulated the above discussion by assigning the Cn into two groups i.e. C1,2 → Ψ
and C3,4 → Φ. Then, we can denote the groups {Ψ,Φ} as a function of the Cn, projection
angle θ, and random phase φm = ±90◦ for Alice and Bob to generate the shared key
bits. If Alice and Bob share the group Ψ{C1, θ1 = +45◦, θ2 = +45◦, φm = −90◦} which
is corresponding to bit ’0’, then the ’-’ SPD4 in Alice will detect the ancilla photon and
Bob’s ’+’ SPD1 will detect the signal photon meaning ’yes’. Similarly, for Ψ{C2, θ1 =
+45◦, θ2 = −45◦, φm = +90◦} → bit′1′, Φ{C3, θ1 = +45◦, θ2 = +45◦, φm = −90◦} → bit′0′,
Φ{C4, θ1 = +45◦, θ2 = −45◦, φm = −90◦} → bit′1′.
Since each group {Ψ,Φ} has bit ’0’ and ’1’ associated with its correlation function Cn and
depended on random phase φm = ±90◦, then how Alice knows her choice of Cn and valid
detection in her detectors can generate key bit in agreement with Bob’s guess on Cn through
his projection angle and valid detection in his detectors. The beauty of this scheme is Alice
and Bob can generate the shared key bits through the shared correlation functions without
requiring any information about the random phase φm = ±90◦ in the source located in the
middle between them. To understand this more clearly, let’s consider the case where the
phase φm = −90◦ in the source. Alice chooses the Ψ{C1, θ1 = +45◦, φm = −90◦} → bit′0′,
Alice has the interference term −cos(2θ1 +φm)→ −cos(2(45◦)−90◦)→ −1 or ’-’ SPD4 will
click registering bit ’0’. Bob has no idea about what Alice’s choice on the {Cn} and the phase
φm = −90◦. Bob has the interference term cos(2θ2 + φm). Bob can only project the HWP3
to θ2 = ±45◦. Bob chooses the θ2 = +45◦(θ2 = −45◦) for his guess on Ψ{C1} → bit′0′
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or Φ{C4} → bit′1′ (Ψ{C2} → bit′1′ or Φ{C3} → bit′0′). Bob knows his guess is right or
wrong through the valid detection in his detector ’+’ SPD1 or ’-’ SPD2, respectively. Bob
did not know the key bit until Alice announces which group {Ψ,Φ} in Step 5. Let’s say,
Bob chooses θ2 = +45
◦, the interference term cos(2(+45◦) − 90◦) → +1 meaning his ’+’
SPD1 will ’click’(’yes’) or his guess on Ψ{C1} →′ 0′ or Φ{C4} →′ 1′ is right. After the signal
transmission, Alice announces the group Ψ of her choice (Step 5). Bob knows the C1 is
right. Then, Alice and Bob share the key bit ’0’ (Step 6). If Bob chooses θ2 = −45◦, the
interference term cos(2(−45◦) − 90◦) → −1 meaning his ’-’ SPD2 will ’click’ or his guess
on Ψ{C2} →′ 1′ or Φ{C3} →′ 0′ is wrong. After the signal transmission, Alice announces
the group Ψ of her choice (Step 5). Bob knew that his guess on Ψ{C2} or bit ’1’ is wrong.
Bob knows the bit is ’0’, then Alice and Bob will share the key bit ’0’ (Step 6). Bob
knows the key bits of Alice regardless his guess is right or wrong. The above scenario
is Alice’s choice of C1 with right phase φm = −90◦. The most intriguing part of this
scheme is Alice knows her key bit regardless her choice of Cn in agreement with the phase
φm = ±90◦. To discuss this, let’s consider the case where the phase φm = +90◦, Alice
still chooses the Ψ{C1, θ1 = +45◦, φm = −90◦} or bit ’0’, the interference term in Alice
−cos(2(45◦) + 90◦) → +1 meaning that the ’+’ SPD3 will ’click’ or bit ’1’. Alice knew
then her choice of C1 is wrong. She also knew that the phase φm = +90◦ was meant for
the Ψ{C2, θ1 = +45◦, φm = +90◦} → bit′1′, so she records the bit ’1’ as registered by her
valid detection. Amazingly, Bob will have the bit ’1’. As discussed above, if Bob chooses
θ2 = +45
◦, the interference term +cos(2(+45◦) + 90◦)→ −1 meaning that his ’-’ SPD2 will
’click’ or ’No’ on his guess. After Alice announces the group Ψ, Bob knew that his guess on
C1 or bit ’0’ is wrong, so he knows that Alice has bit ’1’. The similar description is applied
for the other Ψ{C2}, Φ{C3}, and Φ{C4}.
III. DISCUSSION
Weak coherent state is usually vulnerable to photon-number splitting attack i.e Eve can
tap one signal photon from beam 2 and perform the same measurement as Bob did. In
this protocol, we make use of the phase coding αη system [20–23] to secure beam 1 and
beam 2 from Eve attacks. One can also use differential phase shifted method to distribute
operators cˆ and dˆ at the output of the BS1. The protocol can prevent more than one
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photon in a coherent pulse by applying the condition nx = ny = nc < 1. For example,
2 photons in beam 2 can be attributed to higher photon number in (x, y) mode such
that |1〉x|1〉y, |0〉x|2〉y, |2〉x|0〉y, which will have the expectation value of 〈cˆ′†cˆ′〉 as given by
∝ (n2x +n2y + 2nxny + 2ny√nxnycos(2θ1 +φm + 2nx√nxnycos(2θ1 +φm). It is more sensitive
to the condition nx = ny or it will introduce more errors on Bob if the condition nx = ny is
not fulfilled, even though its contribution is in the order of mean photon number nc less than
the one photon number case (|1〉x|0〉y and |0〉x|1〉y). In other words, the existence of multiple
photons will introduce the percentage of errors in Bob even without the presence of Eve.
The percentage will also be the amount information leaking to Eve in the photon-number
splitting attack.
In intercept-resend attacks, Eve knows that the bit information is not encoded in the
state. He can perform the same measurement as Bob did. Even though we assume that Eve
break the security of the αη, Eve cannot resend a perfect copy of the original signal photon
because the input product of two mode weak coherent states is a nonorthogonal state. For
example, the input product state |α〉x|β〉y of the beam splitter (BS1) will have the output
product state ( |α〉x+ie
±iφm |β〉y√
2
)2(
i|α〉x+e±iφm |β〉y√
2
)1, where the state (
i|α〉x+ie±iφm |β〉y√
2
)2 · eˆ45◦ is sent
to Bob. The non-orthogonality of coherent states and the φm = ±90◦ cannot be measured in
a single measurement. Bob will reveal the present of Eve by sending part of his observations
(Step 3 and 4) to Alice. Let’s say in the second column in Fig.2, Alice knows that Bob is
supposed to observe ’Yes’ with his guess through his projected angle θ2 = +45
◦. Because
of the imperfect copy from Eve, Bob might observe ’No’ with the θ2 = +45
◦, so Alice will
aware of the error and stop the transmission. There is no leakage of information to Eve
because Alice has not implemented Step 5 yet.
IV. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we have presented unique feature of a new scheme based on intrinsic
quantum correlation of weak coherent states for generating key bits between Alice and Bob
through high level communication language. The scheme preserve the randomness of the
light source for doubling the communication distance, and also increase the success rate of
raw key generation compared to Ekert’s protocol, and double the sift key rate compared to
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weak coherent light protocol.
[1] W. K. Wootters, ”Quantum mechanics without probability amplitudes,” Found. Phys. 16, 391
(1986); ”A Wigner-function formulation of finite-state quantum mechanics,” Ann. Phys.(N.Y)
176, 1 (1987); K. S. Gibbons, M. J. Hoffman, and W. K. Wootters, ”Discrete phase space
based on finite fields,” Phys. Rev. A 70, 062101 (2004).
[2] C. Miquel, J. P. Paz, M. Saraceno, E. Knill, R. Laflamine, and C. Negrevergne, ”Interpretation
of tomography and spectroscopy as dual forms of quantum computation,” Nature (London)
418, 59 (2002); W. K. Wootters, ”Picturing qubits in phase space,” arXiv:quant-ph/0306135
(2003);C. Miquel, J. P. Paz, and M. Saraceno, ”Quantum computers in phase space,” Phys.
Rev. A 65, 062309 (2002); P. Bianucci, C. Miquel, J. P. Paz, and M. Saraceno, ”Discrete
Wigner functions and the phase space representation of quantum computers,” Phys. Lett. A
297, 353 (2002)
[3] N. Gisin, G. Ribordy, W. Tittel, and H. Zbinden, ”Quantum cryptography,” Rev. Mod. Phys.
74, 145 (2002).
[4] V. Scarani, H. Bechmann-Pasquinucci, N. J Cerf, M. Dusek, N. Lutkenhaus, and M. Peev,
”The security of practical quantum key distribution,” Rev. Mod. Phys. 81, 1301 (2009).
[5] Y. M Sua, E. Scanlon, T. Beaulieu, V. Bollen, and K. F Lee, ”Intrinsic quantum correlations
of weak coherent states for quantum communication,” Phys. Rev. A 83, 030302(R) (2011).
[6] K. F Lee, ”Observation of bipartite correlations using coherent light for optical communica-
tion,” Opt. Lett. 34, 1099 (2009).
[7] K. F Lee, and J. E Thomas, ”Experimental simulation of two particles quantum entanglement
using classical fields,” Phys. Rev. Lett. 88, 097902 (2002).
[8] K. F Lee, and J. E Thomas, ”Entanglement by using classical wave,” Phys. Rev. A 69, 052311
(2004).
[9] C. H Bennett, G. Brassard, and N. D Mermin, ”Quantum cryptography without Bell’s theo-
rem,” Phys. Rev. Lett. 68, 557 (1992).
[10] W. Schleich, ”Quantum Optics in Phase-Space, Beam splitter transformation in Chapter 13,
1 edition,” Wiley-VCH (2005).
12
[11] G. Brassard, N. Lutkenhaus, T. Mor, and B. C Sanders, ”Limitations on Practical Quantum
Cryptography,” Phys. Rev. Lett. 85, 1330 (2000).
[12] N. Lutkenhaus, ”Security against individual attacks for realistic quantum key distribution,”
Phys. Rev. A 61, 052304 (2000).
[13] W. Y Hwang, ”Quantum key distribution with high loss: toward global secure communica-
tion,” Phys. Rev. Lett. 91, 057901 (2003).
[14] H. W Lo, X. Ma, and K. Chen, ”Decoy State Quantum Key Distribution,” Phys. Rev. Lett.
94, 230504 (2005).
[15] X. B. Wang, ”Beating the photon-number-splitting attack in practical quantum cryptogra-
phy,” Phys. Rev. Lett. 94, 230503 (2005).
[16] V. Scarani, A. Acin, G. Ribordy, and N. Gisin, ”Quantum Cryptography Protocols Robust
against Photon Number Splitting Attacks for Weak Laser Pulse Implementations,” Phys. Rev.
Lett. 92, 057901 (2004).
[17] C. H Bennett, and G. Brassard, ”Quantum Cryptography: Public Key Distribution and Coin
Tossing,” in Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Computers, Systems and
Signal Processing, Bangalore, India(IEEE, New York, 1984) , p.175.
[18] C. H Bennett, ”Quantum cryptography using any two nonorthogonal states,” Phys. Rev. Lett.
68, 3121 (1992).
[19] A. K Ekert, ”Quantum cryptography based on Bells theorem,” Phys. Rev. lett. 67, 661(1991).
[20] G. Barbosa, E. Corndorf, P. Kumar, and H. Yuen, ”Secure Communication using mesoscopic
coherent states,” Phys. Rev. Lett. 90, 227901 (2003).
[21] E. Corndorf, G. Barbosa, C. Liang, H. Yuen, and P. Kumar, ”High-speed data encryption
over 25kmof fiber by two-mode coherent-state quantum cryptography,” Opt. Lett. 28, 2040
(2003).
[22] E. Corndorf, C. Liang, G. S. Kanter, P. Kumar, and H. Yuen, ”Quantum-noise-protected
dataencryption for WDM fiber-optic networks,” Phys. Rev. A 71, 062326 (2005).
[23] C. Liang, G. S. Kanter, E. Corndorf, and P. Kumar, ”Quantum noise protected data encryp-
tionin a WDM network,” IEEE Photonics Technology Letters 17, 1573 (2005).
13
